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THERE’S NO PLACE LIKE “HERE” 
AND NO TIME LIKE “NOW”
Albert Atkin
1. Introduction
Is it possible for me to refer to someone 
other than myself with the word “I”? Or 
somewhere other than where I am with the 
word “here”? Or some time other than the 
present with the word “now”? David Kaplan, 
who provides the best worked out semantics 
for pure-indexical terms like “I,” “here,” and 
“now” (1989) suggests, quite intuitively, that I 
could not. Put simply, “I am here now” looks 
as though I can never utter it and have it turn 
out false. But, intuitive as this seems, one 
need only hear the answering machine mes-
sage, “Sorry! I am not here now,” to see that 
there may be problems. If I can’t fail to refer 
to where I am and when I’m there with “here” 
and “now,” why is my apparently contradic-
tory assertion so readily comprehensible?1
Many have been quick to abandon Kaplan’s 
account of pure-indexicals in the face of such 
problems. The focus of this paper, though, 
is those who develop sophisticated accounts 
of how we determine different contexts for 
applying pure-indexicals. The hope is that 
this handles problem cases while allowing us 
to retain most of Kaplan’s theory. However, 
this paper introduces and examines some 
additional uses of pure-indexicals which 
pose an interesting problem for the context-
determination adaptation of Kaplan’s ac-
count. It is argued that context-determination 
theorists cannot explain these cases in the 
same way that they explain standard problem 
cases, and that any reason they can offer for 
denying the relevance of such cases to ac-
counts of pure-indexicals will apply equally 
well to the cases that motivate their theories, 
thus rendering context-determination ac-
counts superfl uous.
In what follows, then, there is a brief sum-
mary of Kaplan’s account, the problem cases 
that threaten it, and the context-determination 
theorist’s response to these problem cases. 
The interesting and problematic uses of 
pure-indexicals that context-determination 
accounts cannot explain are then introduced, 
and an explanation is given of why there is 
no way for the context-determination theorist 
to exclude these cases from our accounts of 
pure-indexicals without also excluding the 
cases that motivate their own theory.
2. Kaplan’s Account
Famously, in his account of context-sensi-
tive terms such as “I,” “here,” “now,” “this,” 
and “that,” Kaplan (1989) identifies two 
kinds of indexical: Pure-Indexicals and De-
monstratives. What motivates this division 
of indexicals into two types is a variation in 
the way the two refer. According to Kaplan, 
all indexicals have a character or linguistic 
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meaning which serves as a reference-de-
termining rule when applied to the context 
of utterance. The linguistic meaning of a 
pure-indexical need only be applied to that 
context in order to determine a referent. The 
linguistic meaning of a demonstrative, on 
the other hand, is not enough to determine a 
referent; something additional, like a point-
ing or an intention, is required. According to 
this division, “I” “here” and “now” are pure-
indexicals, since “the linguistic rules which 
govern their use fully determine the referent 
for each context” (Kaplan 1989, p. 491), and 
“this” and “that” are demonstratives since 
“[t]he linguistic rules which govern [their] 
use are not suffi cient to determine their refer-
ent in all contexts of use” (Kaplan 1989, p. 
490)—something extra is required. In this pa-
per, the focus of interest is in pure-indexicals, 
and in particular, in one of the consequences 
of Kaplan’s distinction: because the linguistic 
meanings of pure-indexicals fully determine 
their reference when applied to a context, 
their reference is, so to speak, automatic. This 
means that any occurrence of “I” automati-
cally refers to the speaker of the context, any 
occurrence of “here” automatically refers the 
location of the context, and any occurrence of 
“now” automatically refers to the time of the 
context. However, there are uses of the pure-
indexicals which suggest that this is wrong. 
Consider the following two cases:
(1) I notice that students have been turning up 
to see my colleague all morning but he doesn’t 
appear to be in. Rather than leave the students 
hanging around, waiting to see if he answers 
the door, I pick up a Post-it note that I wrote 
yesterday for my own offi ce door and stick it to 
his; the note says, “I am not here now.”2
(2) A historian giving a lecture on Napoleon 
in 2005 says, “It is 1796. Napoleon, now 
commander of the French army, marches on 
Austria.”3
There are many similar examples in the 
literature, but these two cases are largely 
indicative of the diffi culties facing Kaplan’s 
account. Now, why are these cases problem-
atic? Well, in (1), if Kaplan is right and the 
reference for pure-indexicals is automatic, 
then the indexicals in the note I stick to my 
colleague’s door refer to me (since I wrote it), 
to my offi ce (since that is where I wrote it), 
and to yesterday (since that is when I wrote 
it). However, the students appear to have no 
problem in taking the note to refer to my col-
league, his offi ce, and the time they read the 
note, as intended. Similarly for (2): Kaplan’s 
account suggests that “now” refers to the 
time the historian makes his utterance. But 
everyone in the lecture, quite rightly, takes 
“now” to refer to 1796. This is not as Kaplan 
predicts. We must conclude that something is 
wrong with his account of pure-indexicals.
3. Context-Determination Accounts
There are a range of responses to such cases, 
but the focus here is on what we shall call the 
“context-determination” responses of Predelli 
(1998a, 1998b), Romdenh-Romluc (2002), 
and Corazza, Fish, and Gorvett (2002). There 
are important differences among these three 
accounts, but, crucially, all wish to retain the 
fundamental parts of Kaplan’s theory, and all 
agree on why Kaplan appears to have prob-
lems with cases like (1) and (2). The starting 
point for all context-determination accounts 
is to note that Kaplan is right that pure-indexi-
cals determine reference automatically with 
respect to a context, but wrong to assume that 
the context to which linguistic meanings are 
applied is automatically the context of utter-
ance. For example, it is quite clear that neither 
the historian in (2), nor his audience, identify 
the time of utterance as the referent for his 
use of “now.” But, if the linguistic meaning of 
“now” is automatically applied to the context 
of utterance, then it seems that determining 
the time of utterance as referent is unavoid-
able, even though such a result offends our 
intuitions. The context-determination theo-
rist, then, thinks that Kaplan’s theory must be 
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amended, by rejecting the assumption that the 
appropriate reference-determining context is 
automatically the context of utterance, and 
instead, fi nding a different method for deter-
mining the appropriate context in any given 
case. The benefi t of this is that the linguistic 
meaning for pure-indexicals stays fi xed and 
stable from case to case, and still determines 
a referent automatically when applied to a 
context. The trick for dealing with problem 
cases is to work out which context is appropri-
ate for applying linguistic meaning.
So, how do context-determination accounts 
work? The key idea, as stated above, is that 
since there can be no automatic assumptions 
about where to apply linguistic meaning, an 
alternative method for determining which 
context is appropriate must be found. Once 
such a method is to hand and has been used 
in some case to determine a context, mat-
ters proceed, by and large, as Kaplan sug-
gests—by applying the linguistic meanings 
of pure-indexicals to that context, thereby 
determining reference automatically. For 
instance, Predelli (1998a, 1998b) identifi es 
the appropriate context in any given case 
as the intended context of interpretation. If 
this method is applied to (1) above, then the 
context of interpretation I intend for my note 
is that context where students gather around 
my colleague’s door, and not the context 
where I produce the note. By applying the 
linguistic meanings of “I,” “here” and “now” 
to the intended context of interpretation the 
referents seem to come out right, and in the 
automatic manner that Kaplan suggests.4 
It looks, then, as though by dropping the 
assumption that the appropriate context is 
automatically the context of utterance, and 
instead adopting a context-determination 
account, it is possible to overcome problems 
like (1) and (2) without diffi culty, and keep 
the fundamentals of Kaplan’s account. As 
stated above, however, there are other cases 
which context-determination theorists cannot 
deal with, and cannot exclude from accounts 
of pure-indexicals without rendering their 
own theories superfl uous.
4. Newer Problem Cases
Consider the following two cases:
(3) At the local concert hall I listen to a 
performance of a Mozart Divertimento. As 
the music proceeds, a friend whispers, “listen 
how the second couplet and third refrain are 
repeated back-to-back.” He then pauses and 
says, “Here Mozart gives the line of the refrain 
to the oboe.”
(4) I watch a TV program where someone hikes 
while giving a commentary on his journey. As 
he begins to walk down a mountainside, he 
pauses and says to camera, “The Mountain now 
descends steeply to the sea.”
Clearly, these cases use pure-indexicals 
in unusual ways, but then, so do (1) and (2). 
So why do (3) and (4) represent problems 
for context-determination accounts? The 
diffi culty becomes clear when the results of 
applying context-determination theories to 
these cases are examined in more detail.
Taking Predelli (1998a, 1998b) as the best 
example of context-determination accounts, 
the appropriate context for reference deter-
mination in these cases, as identifi ed by the 
intended context of interpretation, happens 
to be the context of utterance.5 However, ap-
plying the linguistic meanings for “here” and 
“now” to this context determines the wrong 
referents. In (3), applying the linguistic mean-
ing for “here” to the appropriate context, the 
context of utterance, determines the concert 
hall, (the location of the context), but the 
referent is clearly the time when the oboe 
begins to play the refrain. In (4), applying 
the character for “now” to the appropriate 
context, the context of utterance, determines 
the time of utterance (whenever that may 
have been), but the real referent is the loca-
tion on the mountain where the descent to the 
sea begins. Following context-determination 
theorists, then, will lead us to apply linguistic 
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meaning to the context of utterance in (3) and 
(4), but it is clear that this will not determine 
the right referents. Something has gone 
wrong for context-determination accounts 
in these cases.6
What is immediately obvious is that con-
text-determination theorists cannot allow 
these cases to feature in their account of pure-
indexicals. If they do, then there are clear uses 
of pure-indexicals for which they do not get 
the referents right and so their account does 
not give a full and adequate explanation of 
pure-indexicals. Cases such as (3) and (4), 
then, are damaging unless the context-de-
termination theorist has a principled reason 
for excluding them from accounts of pure-
indexicals. However, the two most promising 
reasons for excluding (3) and (4), that is, to 
treat them as either demonstratives, or as 
idiomatic uses, apply equally well to cases 
like (1) and (2). If the context-determination 
theorist exploits these grounds for exclusion, 
they effectively explain away the cases that 
motivate their account.
5. Ruling Out Simple Responses
Although, as mentioned above, the two 
most promising responses to (3) and (4) are 
to suggest that “here” and “now” either func-
tion as demonstratives, or are idiomatic—and 
these cases are examined in more detail short-
ly—there are other less fruitful, although im-
mediately intuitive, responses that are worth 
pausing for if only to rule them out quickly. 
The obvious response to these cases is that, 
fi rst, sentences like (3) and (4) are awkward, 
contrived, at best marginal, and not something 
that any theory should want to include; and, 
secondly, that sentences like (3) and (4) are 
literally true: that is, in (3) “here” picks out a 
place (and not a time), and in (4) “now” picks 
out a time (and not a place). What should be 
said about these simple responses? After all, if 
such responses are available and effective, the 
context-determination has no need to engage 
with cases like (3) and (4) at all, let alone fi nd 
a good reason to exclude them.
The clear response to the claim that (3) and 
(4) are contrived, awkward or marginal is to 
point out that such cases are far more com-
monplace and mundane than might initially 
be suspected, and that, as odd as such uses 
of indexicals may look, speakers really have 
little diffi culty using and understanding them. 
Take for example, that I frequently watch 
fi lms with my partner who constantly tells 
me bits of information like “Here’s where 
that stunt I was telling you about happens,” 
or “Here’s where Jody discovers that Jack is 
really Jim!” Such instances are quite com-
mon. My partner has no qualms about using 
“here” in this way, and I have no problems 
in understanding her when she makes such 
utterances. But most importantly, these com-
mon uses are just like (3); they are uses of 
“here” where the referent is not locational. 
Similarly, I mark numerous student essays 
each year that use sentences such as “having 
established the Cogito, Descartes now argues 
that we clearly and distinctly perceive God,” 
or even, “having shown X, I will now show 
that Y follows.” When I read such sentences, 
I don’t fi nd myself disturbed by how uncom-
mon they are. Nor do I fi nd myself struggling 
to get to grips with what the student means. 
Rather, sentences like these which, in the 
manner of (4), use “now” with a non-tempo-
ral referent, are just straightforward to use, 
and straightforward to understand. So, far 
from being contrived, awkward or marginal, 
such utterances are common, and fi t neatly 
alongside more “normal” uses of “here” and 
“now.”
As for the second claim, that sentences like 
(3) and (4) are literally true, the idea is that 
in (3) “here” picks out a place or position in 
the musical score, as if we are identifying a 
particular spot on a sheet of music, and in (4), 
“now” picks out a time in the journey, as if 
we are following a list of instructions about 
the temporal sequence of the journey. But 
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when they are judged in light of speakers’ 
and hearers’ communicative intentions and 
understanding, it is clear that these literal 
readings of (3) and (4) are not correct.
In (3), if I ask my friend to be clearer about 
where he means (assuming of course he 
doesn’t think my question too odd), he will 
likely clarify with “just then,” a response with 
clear temporal intent, rather than by fi nding 
sheet music and pointing to the bar where the 
oboe takes the refrain. It seems obvious that 
my friend intends to identify a time with his 
use of “here,” and it is equally obvious that I 
pick out a time by attending to his utterance. 
For our exchange, the presence or otherwise 
of a score is simply irrelevant. And of course, 
when my partner tells me what is about to 
happen in the fi lm we are watching, at no 
point does she intend to tell me anything 
about a place or location in a script, and at 
no point do I take her be doing anything but 
telling me what is going on in the fi lm at the 
particular time she speaks.
Similarly, in (4), if a hiking-companion 
of the presenter asks “when does the path 
descend?” again, assuming the presenter is 
charitable and doesn’t think his companion 
rather misunderstood what he said, the pre-
senter will likely clarify with “just there”; a 
locational utterance. Indeed, the time in the 
journey is simply irrelevant to the presenter’s 
reference. The hikers could take a route which 
does not include the steep path (but passes 
close by say) yet still point out its sudden 
descent to the sea. The only constraint on the 
presenter being able to make this utterance is 
that he be near the path, again emphasizing 
the locational referent. And of course, when 
my students tell me that “Descartes now 
argues . . . ” I don’t take them to mean that 
Descartes began to set out his position at the 
time they inscribed that sentence. Rather, I 
take them to refer to a place in the overall 
structure of Descartes’s philosophy where he 
argues for our clear and distinct perception 
of God.7
Overall, then, these immediate responses to 
sentences like (3) and (4) are not enough to 
dispel the problems they pose, and context-
determination theorists will have to chal-
lenge these cases on different grounds. And 
of course, as will be shown, although these 
grounds may well be a good way to handle 
sentences like (3) and (4), context-determi-
nation theorists cannot use them without 
undermining their own theories.
6. Examining More Promising 
Responses
As suggested earlier, the two most promis-
ing arguments for excluding (3) and (4) are to 
claim either that they function as demonstra-
tives, or that they are idiomatic. The argument 
given below, though, suggests that although 
either response may well explain (3) and (4), 
neither response is open to the context-deter-
mination theorist.
The fi rst of these promising responses, 
then, is to claim that (3) and (4) are what are 
commonly called “demonstrative uses.”8 For 
example, although “here” is usually treated 
as a pure-indexical, there are occasions when 
it is used with some essential extra-linguistic 
clue, as when I point at a place on a map and 
say, “Next week I shall be here.” Kaplan is 
aware of such uses (1989, p. 491), but thinks 
they can be excluded from our account of 
pure-indexicals. For Kaplan (and others), it 
is acceptable to treat such uses as though they 
are demonstratives since chief in determining 
their reference is an accompanying clue to 
saliency. Consequently, there is no need to 
let such cases infect standard treatments of 
pure-indexicals.
Now, if it is possible to employ this strategy 
against cases like (3) and (4) and treat them 
as demonstrative uses, then, so the argument 
goes, there is a principled reason for excluding 
them and they need not threaten the context-
determination account. It is only when these 
cases are treated as pure-indexicals that 
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they fail to determine the referent expected 
of them. But can the context-determination 
theorist employ this strategy and exclude such 
cases as demonstrative uses? The answer is 
no, and for two reasons. It is not so clear cut 
that cases like (3) and (4) are like demonstra-
tive readings by any usual standards. But, 
most importantly, even assuming the context-
determination theorist can make a case for 
treating (3) and (4) as demonstratives, this 
strategy applies equally well to cases such as 
(1) and (2). Thus the strategy renders context-
determination theories obsolete. Let’s look at 
these two reasons in more depth.
First then, is it clear that cases like (3) 
and (4) are demonstrative uses? The nearest 
thing to a standard criterion for distinguish-
ing normal uses from demonstrative uses is 
that the latter can be read as paraphrases of 
normal demonstratives.9 For instance, when 
I point at a map and say, “Next week I shall 
be here,” I might be understood as saying 
“Next week I shall be there”; it seems as 
though “there” is the obvious paraphrase for 
“here.” However, applying this technique to 
(3) and (4), the obvious paraphrase is not a 
demonstrative. In (3), the obvious paraphrase 
for “here” is “now,” and in (4) the obvious 
paraphrase for “now” is “here”; these are 
pure-indexicals. It is not clear, then, that (3) 
and (4) are best explained as demonstrative 
uses of pure-indexicals, and it is not clear that 
the context-determination theorist can use 
such a claim to defl ect these new cases.
The context-determination theorist could 
claim, of course, that the paraphrase criterion 
is not the best way to determine when a pure-
indexical is being used as a demonstrative, but 
this leads to the second, and arguably more 
crucial, reason why this strategy is not open to 
the context-determination theorist. The clear-
est grounds that the context-determination 
theorist has for claiming that (3) and (4) 
are demonstrative uses of pure-indexicals is 
that in such cases following the rule for the 
pure-indexical gets us nowhere, and instead 
some clue to saliency (for example, pointing 
or prominence) is required. The exact nature 
of the clue to saliency is, of course, contro-
versial, but it seems clear that in (3) and (4) 
linguistic meaning isn’t enough, and clues 
to saliency do most of the work. So for in-
stance, it is by standing on the spot where the 
mountain begins to descend to the sea that the 
utterer in (4) indicates the location to which 
he refers, despite using a temporal term. And 
similarly, it is in virtue of the obviously care-
ful temporal placing of “here” that the utterer 
in (3) indicates the time to which he refers, 
despite using a locational term. This is the 
clearest case for thinking that (3) and (4) are 
demonstrative uses; they may fail the obvi-
ous paraphrase test, but they clearly use some 
extra-linguistic clue to saliency to determine 
their referents, just as demonstratives.
Now, it may be that this is the best way to 
treat these cases and there is some mileage 
in this claim. This option, however, is not 
open to the context-determination theorist. 
Using this argument may prove effective 
against cases like (3) and (4), but if they use 
such an argument, the context-determination 
theorists are, so to speak, poisoning their own 
well. The reason is simply that the claim that 
cases like (3) and (4) rely on clues to saliency 
and so are demonstratives applies equally 
well to the cases that motivate the context-
determination account, e.g., cases like (1) 
and (2). For instance, in (1), it is by placing 
the note on the offi ce door that I indicate to 
students who, where, and when the note refers 
to; the door the note is stuck to provides a 
clue to saliency. And in (2), it is in virtue of 
the preparatory statement, “It is 1796,” that 
the historian is able to use “now” to refer to 
that time. Such a statement serves as a clue 
to saliency. But this has to be a problem for 
the context-determination theorist. If it is 
also possible to explain (1) and (2) as de-
monstrative uses, then the motivation to put 
right what’s wrong with Kaplan’s account of 
pure-indexicals with context-determination is 
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lost; all such problem cases are demonstrative 
uses and can, in principle, be excluded from 
our considerations about pure-indexicals. 
There is no longer a problem, and no longer 
any need for a solution. It seems, then, as 
though the context-determination theorist 
cannot exclude cases like (3) and (4) in this 
way without rendering his own account of 
pure-indexicals superfl uous. In short, if the 
context-determination theorist has found a 
reason not to worry about (3) and (4), then 
he seems to have found a reason for Kaplan 
not to worry about (1) and (2).10
The second potential response to such 
cases is to treat them as idioms. For instance, 
Corazza (2004, p. 166) says, “When ‘now’ 
and ‘here’ are not used to pick out a time and 
location they belong to the idiomatic use of 
language.”11 If, the context-determination 
theorist may argue, cases like (3) and (4) can 
be dismissed as idiomatic, then there is no 
reason to be concerned by them. After all, the 
word “bucket” in the idiom “kick the bucket” 
fails to refer to a bucket, but literal reference 
failure in idiomatic contexts does not color 
our theory about how “bucket” refers in non-
idiomatic contexts. If (3) and (4) are idiomatic 
uses, then the context-determination theorists 
have a principled reason to exclude them from 
their account of pure-indexicals. As with the 
demonstrative reading response, however, 
two reasons rule out such a move. It is not 
altogether clear that cases like (3) and (4) 
behave as idioms by any usual standards. 
But, more importantly, any workable case 
the context-determination theorist can make 
applies equally well to cases like (1) and (2), 
again rendering their theories obsolete.
First then, are (3) and (4) obviously idi-
omatic? By any standard interpretation, (3) 
and (4) do not behave as idioms. Take, for 
example, the idiom “kick the bucket” in the 
following sentence:
(5) John kicked the bucket
This may have a literal reading (where 
John actually kicks a bucket) or an idiomatic 
reading (where John dies). On its idiomatic 
reading, (5) is resistant to re-ordering and 
interruption.12 For instance:
(5a) The bucket John kicked
(5b) John kicked the leaky old bucket
are topicalized, and modifi ed versions of 
(5). But, (5a) and (5b) only make sense on a 
literal, non-idiomatic reading of (5). Idioms, 
then, cannot be re-ordered or modifi ed and 
still retain their idiomatic meaning. Now, if 
(3) and (4) are also idiomatic, they too should 
be resistant to such re-ordering and interrup-
tion. It seems, however, that (3) and (4) are 
not resistant to re-ordering and interruption. 
For instance:
(3a) To the oboe Mozart here gives the re-
frain.
(3b) Here Mozart gives the refrain to the ver-
satile oboe.
(4a) To the sea the mountain now descends 
steeply.
(4b) The rugged mountain now descends 
steeply to the cold sea.
Although these changes sound awkward, it 
does not alter the meaning of (3) and (4). 
Clearly, then, these cases are not resistant to 
re-ordering and modifi cation, and so are not 
idiomatic if judged by the standard behavior 
of idioms.
Of course, the context-determination 
theorist may respond here by pointing out 
that although cases like (3) and (4) do not 
behave as idioms, describing them as “idi-
omatic uses” is merely meant to highlight 
the non-standard nature of such cases rather 
than to suggest any parallels with phrases like 
“spill the beans” or “hit the books.” As those 
working on idioms point out, an idiom is “a 
phrase (or sentence) which is conventionally 
used with a meaning different from its literal 
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constructed meaning” (Davis 1983, p. 68). 
Such a consideration applies to (3) and (4); 
the literal reading of these sentences treats 
“here” as locational and “now” as temporal, 
but this differs from the conventional reading 
where, as we have seen, “here” is treated as 
temporal and “now” as locational. Indeed, 
some time has already been spent above 
arguing against the literal reading of (3) and 
(4). It seems, then, that if a loose reading of 
“idiomatic uses” is allowed, then cases like 
(3) and (4) are idiomatic. Thus these cases 
can be excluded from our accounts of pure-
indexicals. However, even though there may 
be mileage in this approach it is clearly not 
open to the context-determination theorist. 
Again, if they adopt such an approach to ex-
clude (3) and (4), they poison their own well 
and exclude cases like (1) and (2).
In conventional use, the meaning of (1) 
“I am not here now,” where it is written by 
me and placed on my colleague’s door some 
time later, is that my colleague is not in his 
room at the time the students read the note. 
But the literal meaning is that I am not at the 
place where I wrote the note at the time when 
I wrote the note.13 Clearly, then, the literal 
meaning of (1) differs from the conventional 
meaning in this case, and, by the standards 
used to exclude (3) and (4), must therefore 
count as idiomatic and should also be exclud-
ed from our accounts of pure-indexicals. And 
of course, similar considerations hold for (2); 
conventional meaning allows “now” to refer 
to 1796, but in a strict literal sense, “now” 
refers to the time when the historian makes 
the utterance in question. Obviously, this is a 
problem for context-determination theorists. 
If their means for excluding (3) and (4) also 
exclude (1) and (2) from accounts of pure-
indexicals, then they have explained away 
the very cases that motivate their theories; 
the context-determination theorists’ reasons 
for excluding (3) and (4) become Kaplan’s 
reasons for excluding (1) and (2).
7. Conclusion
What, then, does this all mean for context-
determination accounts of pure-indexicals?
On the one hand, Predelli et al. cannot allow 
cases like (3) and (4) to stand, since their ac-
counts systematically fail to get the reference 
right. On the other hand, the clearest grounds 
for excluding (3) and (4) are options that the 
context-determination theorist cannot take, 
since these grounds also exclude the cases 
which motivate their account. Without any 
need to explain these cases within an account 
of pure-indexicals, there is no need for a 
context-determination account. The problem 
facing the context-determination theorist, at 
least with respect to problem cases, is clear. 
Either they must fi nd a reason for excluding 
these cases that does not undermine their ac-
count; or they must accept that their account 
is fl awed.14
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NOTES
1. As it turns out, answering machine messages are not the only place where pure-indexicals are used 
to refer to counter-intuitive times, places, and agents. Cases will be introduced below, but for examples, 
see, among others, Vision (1985), Smith (1989), Sidelle (1991), and Salmon (1991).
2. This example is adapted from Corazza, Fish, and Gorvett (2002).
3. This example is adapted from Predelli (1998a).
4. Other context-determination theorists identify the appropriate context differently. Romdenh-Romluc 
(2002) determines the appropriate context via to the context identifi ed by a competent and attentive 
audience using cues from a speaker. Corazza, Fish, and Gorvett (2002) determine the appropriate context 
via the conventions surrounding the “setting” in which the pure-indexical is used.
5. For the record, following the methods prescribed by Romdenh-Romluc or Corazza Corazza, Fish, 
and Gorvett (cf. note 4) determines, mutatis mutandis, the same appropriate context in (3) and (4) as 
Predelli’s method.
6. In fact, it should be obvious that applying the linguistic meanings of “here” and “now” to any context 
in (3) and (4) will fail to pick out the right referents: the linguistic meanings of these indexicals always 
pick out location for (3) when a time is needed, and a time for (4) when a location is needed.
7. It may be controversial whether a place or position in the structure of an argument is a place in the 
appropriate sense, i.e., a place that could be best picked out by “here,” but it should be clear that in such 
a case “now” is not picking out a time and cannot be read literally.
8. Thanks to Jenny Saul for suggesting this possible response.
9. See, for instance, Romdenh-Romluc (2002, p. 35, n. 2).
10. Whether or not Kaplan should worry about deviant instances of pure-indexicals is, of course, a 
separate issue. This much, though, is clear—context-determination theories cannot offer Kaplan away 
out of these problems if they cannot deal with cases like (3) and (4).
11. Corazza (2004) proposes an anaphoric “tacit initiator” account to handle such cases. It is not, 
however, a context-determination account and so I shall not discuss it here.
12. See Huddleston (1984, pp. 42–44) for a standard explanation of sentence behavior under idiomatic 
readings.
13. It is this literal reading that generates the wide spread belief that “I am not here now” is a logical 
falsehood since it cannot be uttered truly. This intuition clearly relies on the literal constructed meaning 
of sentences like (1).
14. Thanks to Jenny Saul, Philip Percival, Gary Kemp, and Alan Carter for their helpful comments and 
suggestions.
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